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Corporate illegality is often attributed to greed by corporate managers 
and insufficient legal safeguards.  Underlying this argument is an explicit 
critique of corporate crime regulatory systems.  Yet there is little systematic 
investigation of the relative merits of different types or components of 
crime-control strategies; research comparing more punitive command-and-
control strategies with self-regulatory approaches is particularly lacking.  
In this Article, we assess these crime prevention-and-control mechanisms in 
the context of individual and situational risk factors that may increase the 
likelihood of illegal behavior in the environmental arena.  We use data 
drawn from two groups of business managers who participated in a 
factorial survey (using vignettes) measuring their intentions to participate 
in two types of environmental offenses.  Generally, results show that the 
most effective regulatory levers are (1) credible legal sanctions and (2) the 
certainty and severity of informal discovery by significant others in the 
firm.  We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for 
regulatory policy and strategy, and for efforts to account for the role of 
social norms in corporate environmental compliance. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As a subtype of white-collar crime, corporate crime is typically 
understood to involve illegal behavior by firms and their agents (executives 
and managers) in the pursuit of corporate benefit.
1
  Criminologists 
recognize that even though corporations as juridical persons can be charged 
with illegal activity, corporations per se do not “act.”  Rather, managers 
make decisions and act on behalf of the company.  As corporate “actors,” 
managers also are potentially subject to sanctions for their participation in 
or knowledge of corporate illegality.
2
  Enforcement provisions for 
environmental crime allow criminal prosecution, in addition to 




Most corporate crime research focuses on firm, industry, and manager 
 
1 See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 6 
(1984).  This definition does not preclude the notion that self-interest may be an indirect 
cause and consequence of corporate crime in that managers who “problem solve” 
successfully, albeit illegally, may reap rewards as an aftereffect. 
2 See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 834 (1994); Urska Velikonja, Leverage, Sanctions, and Deterrence 
of Accounting Fraud, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1281, 1284 (2011). 
3 See Dorothy Thornton et al., General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental 
Behavior, 27 LAW & POL’Y 262, 263–64 (2005).  
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attributes to differentiate offenders from nonoffenders.
4
  While this 
approach is a reasonable one, it often leaves out an important characteristic 
associated with company (and employee) compliance: the regulatory 
environment.  Specifically, the regulatory environment influences and 




Putatively, command-and-control policies—compliance rules imposed 
and “policed” by the government with an emphasis on punitive sanctions 
for violators—influence corporate crime because corporate managers are 
instrumental actors.
6
  Decisions and actions flow from a cost–benefit 
assessment of both the pecuniary and nonpecuniary pros and cons 
associated with illegal activity.  If the benefits of crime are high and the risk 
of discovery and punishment is low, then criminal opportunities increase as 
actors perceive less risk associated with illegal activities.
7
 
Another regulatory strategy shifts the primary mechanism of 
compliance away from the government to the organization itself and to 
individual actors within it.  This approach is less reliant on formal 
regulation (although the government often plays a secondary role through 
“enforced” self-regulation) and builds on what Braithwaite has called a 
 
4 See MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 43–53 (1980); 
EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 17–28 (1949); DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., 
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND CRIMINAL CAREERS 143–49 (2001); Cindy R. Alexander & Mark 
A. Cohen, Why Do Corporations Become Criminals? Ownership, Hidden Actions, and 
Crime as an Agency Cost, 5 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 2–5 (1999); Kristy Holtfreter, Is Occupational 
Fraud “Typical” White-Collar Crime? A Comparison of Individual and Organizational 
Characteristics, 33 J. CRIM. JUST. 353, 354–56 (2005). 
5 See MICHAEL L. BENSON & SALLY S. SIMPSON, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: AN 
OPPORTUNITY PERSPECTIVE 193–94 (2009); Henry C. Finney & Henry R. Lesieur, A 
Contingency Theory of Organizational Crime, in 1 RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
ORGANIZATIONS 255, 255 (Samuel B. Bacharach ed., 1982). 
6 See generally NEAL SHOVER & ANDY HOCHSTETLER, CHOOSING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 
168 (2006) (developing the authors’ theory, which assumes a rational actor model, and 
opining that sanctions do not work because the command-and-control model is not 
successfully implemented); Gilbert Geis, Is Incarceration an Appropriate Sanction for the 
Nonviolent White-Collar Offender?, in CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN CORRECTIONS 152 
(Charles B. Fields ed., 1999) (arguing yes). 
7 See Mark A. Cohen & Sally S. Simpson, The Origins of Corporate Criminality: 
Rational Individual and Organizational Actors, in DEBATING CORPORATE CRIME 33, 36 
(William S. Lofquist et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter Cohen & Simpson, Origins of Corporate 
Criminality] (extending the economic model to incorporate nonpecuniary costs and benefits 
such as informal reputation sanctions); Mark A. Cohen, Environmental Crime and 
Punishment: Legal/Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Federal 
Environmental Statutes, 82 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1054, 1063–64 (1992) [hereinafter 
Cohen, Environmental Crime and Punishment] (providing a formal economic model of the 
costs and benefits of illegal corporate environmental behavior). 
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“family model” of crime control.8   
Good corporate citizens are firms whose managers, when confronted with corporate 
criminal opportunities, will be guided by a sense of right and wrong, by their 
understanding of how others are likely to view their behavior, and by the extent to 
which they think the discovery of these acts would bring shame on their companies.
9
   
Effective self-regulation by firms (ethics programs, internal compliance 
mechanisms, and sensitivity to informal sanctions) should narrow criminal 
opportunities. 
In the corporate crime literature, there has been extensive discussion 
and debate about different regulatory strategies but far too little systematic 
investigation of the relative merits of each, and few have taken into account 
the range of solutions that can be included in regulatory policy.
10
  
Consequently, scholars and policymakers know very little about “what 
works, what doesn’t, and what’s promising” regarding corporate crime-
control strategies.
11
  In the current study, we offer some empirical insight 
into this question. 
In this Article, we examine the prevention and control of corporate 
environmental crime in the context of individual and firm-level 
characteristics that have been linked conceptually and empirically to 
corporate crime.  Specifically, we focus on the extent to which decisions by 
managers to violate environmental laws are affected by command-and-
control or self-regulation prevention-and-control strategies, controlling for 
known risk factors for crime.  This research improves on the prior literature 
in several ways.  Much of the corporate crime literature relies heavily on 
official data sources.  As criminologists are well aware, official 
observations are limited to illegal acts recorded by enforcement agents and 
neglect those acts that do not come to the attention of authorities.  Of equal 
importance, these data sources do not allow researchers to learn what 
managers are actually thinking, leaving the intra-organizational 
decisionmaking process virtually uninvestigated.  The current study 
addresses both of these issues by using data from a factorial survey to 
examine managerial decisionmaking within a corporate context.  Our goal 
is to determine the extent to which regulatory strategies are effective in the 
 
8 See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 54–68 (1989). 
9 Sally S. Simpson et al., The Social Control of Corporate Criminals: Shame and 
Informal Sanction Threats, in OF CRIME & CRIMINALITY: THE USE OF THEORY IN EVERYDAY 
LIFE 141, 142 (Sally S. Simpson ed., 2000). 
10 See NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY 37–88 (1998). 
11 LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT 
WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T, WHAT’S PROMISING (1996), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf 
files/171676.PDF. 
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context of situational and individual pushes/pulls toward illegal behavior. 
In Part II of this Article, we describe the regulatory context and review 
previous research on environmental noncompliance.  We focus particularly 
on organizational and individual factors that increase the risk of crime.  In 
Part III, we describe the current research design and research participants.  
Part IV contains our analysis and results.  We conclude, in Part V, with a 
discussion of the findings, particularly their implications for successful 
regulatory regimes. 
II. PRIOR LITERATURE 
A. REGULATORY STRATEGIES AND CORPORATE OFFENDING 
Regulatory strategies often overlap.  Regulatory instruments and 
institutions are interconnected,
12
 and some strategies, such as responsive 
regulation, are built around the argument that “regulatory policy should 
take neither a solely deterrent nor a solely cooperative approach.”13  
Although it is somewhat simplistic to classify regulation into distinct 
types,
14
 Gunningham, Grabosky, and Sinclair argue that it is useful to 
examine both the prevention and control capacities of different regulatory 
strategies given that “a particular instrument which may appear attractive, 
when looked at on its own, may work quite differently when introduced 
alongside others.”15  Below, we identify the key components of two 
regulatory strategies (command-and-control and self-regulation) and 
highlight how each is expected to or has been shown to affect corporate 
crime prevention and control.
16
  In addition, we discuss the important role 
 
12 See GUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 10, at 37–38. 
13 Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen & Christine Parker, Testing Responsive Regulation in 
Regulatory Enforcement, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 376, 376 (2009). 
14 See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 17–18 (1992). 
15 GUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 10, at 132. 
16 See Cohen & Simpson, Origins of Corporate Criminality, supra note 7, at 34–35.  The 
regulation literature is cross-disciplinary and extensive.  There are many other relevant 
components of regulatory policy that could be considered here, such as the influence of 
nongovernmental organizations and corporate gatekeepers on firm compliance.  See, e.g., 
JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 15–54 
(2006); Bridget M. Hutter & Clive J. Jones, Business Risk Management Practices: The 
Influence of State Regulatory Agencies and Non-State Sources 17 (Ctr. for Analysis of Risk 
and Regulation at the London Sch. of Econ. and Political Sci., Discussion Paper No. 41, 
2006).  Other components to consider are the barriers to compliance posed by regulatory 
accretion.  See generally J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The 
Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003) 
(discussing this concept).  Our aims are more modest.  We wish to better understand how 
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of informal sanctions either as a control mechanism that can be triggered by 
command-and-control interventions or as complementary with self-
regulatory strategies. 
1. Command and Control 
In command-and-control strategies, legal authorities dictate the terms 
of compliance, relying on the threat of formal legal sanctions to achieve 
compliance with those terms.
17
  High detection risk coupled with certain 
and severe punishments should deter most offenders.  Empirically, 
however, the story is more complicated than this.  Some research supports 
the contention that punitive sanctions affect firm and plant behavior, but 
findings overall are mixed.  Cohen, for instance, finds that Coast Guard 
inspections and monitoring reduce spills at the firm level (a general 
deterrence effect) and that the frequency of inspection is more important 
than sanction severity.
18
  Simpson, Garner, and Gibbs find little evidence 
that sanctions of any type (e.g., inspections, informal or formal 
interventions) associated with Clean Water Act enforcement inhibit 
reoffending (i.e., specific deterrence).
19
  Plant-level studies more 
consistently show a specific deterrence effect associated with 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) monitoring and enforcement, and 
a recent review of the empirical literature on enforcement, conducted by 
Gray and Shimshack, finds both specific and general deterrence associated 




specific mechanisms associated with two regulatory strategies affect the way managers think 
and may behave.  In this regard, our work helps to fill an empirical deficit noted by Hutter 
and Jones: 
We know that the sources of regulation and risk management are diversifying, as are the tools 
and techniques employed to manage and regulate risks.  What we do not have is much 
empirically informed research about the range of sources influencing the business world and in 
particular the weighting of influence exercised by them. 
Hutter & Jones, supra, at 1. 
17 See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of 
Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1187–90 (1998). 
18 Mark A. Cohen, Empirical Research on the Deterrent Effect of Environmental 
Enforcement and Monitoring, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10245, 10246 (2000). 
19 See SALLY S. SIMPSON ET AL., WHY DO CORPORATIONS OBEY ENVIRONMENTAL LAW? 
ASSESSING PUNITIVE AND COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES OF CORPORATE CRIME CONTROL 2 
(2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/220693.pdf. 
20 See generally Cohen, supra note 18, at 10246 (providing evidence that environmental 
monitoring and enforcement serves both specific and general deterrence functions); Wayne 
B. Gray & Mary E. Deily, Compliance and Enforcement: Air Pollution Regulation in the 
U.S. Steel Industry, 31 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 96 (1996) (discussing how mill 
compliance with air pollution regulations was associated with substantial regulatory 
activity—inspections or other enforcement actions); Wayne B. Gray & Jay P. Shimshack, 
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Scenario-based survey research, which largely focuses on 
environmental and other forms of corporate offending (e.g., bribery, sales 
fraud, price-fixing), shows that current and prospective managers report 
reasonably high expectations that corporate crimes will be discovered by 
legal authorities and that ensuing sanctions will be costly, particularly when 
individuals (as opposed to the company) are targeted.
21
  Thus, command-
and-control strategies based on discovery and punishment should lower 
corporate offending.  But once again, the relationship is far from 
straightforward.  In one study, threats of formal sanctions are mediated 
through individual characteristics such as morality
22
 and outcome 
expectations.
23
  Formal punishments are less relevant once informal 




Self-regulatory approaches (typically offered as a complementary 
strategy in conjunction with government-enforced regulation) presume that 
prosocial norms and values coupled with effective internal compliance 
systems (e.g., clear accountability, communication of expectations, 
effective monitoring, and appropriate reprimands when violations occur) 
will secure compliance.
25
  Braithwaite’s “family model” of self-regulation 
 
The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical 
Evidence, 5 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 3 (2011) (providing a summary of the empirical 
literature on the impact of environmental monitoring and enforcement on plant/facility-level 
compliance); Benoît Laplante & Paul Rilstone, Environmental Inspections and Emissions of 
the Pulp and Paper Industry in Quebec, 31 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 19 (1996) (discussing 
how both the inspection and threat of inspection have a strong negative impact on plant-level 
pollution emissions); Wesley A. Magat & W. Kip Viscusi, Effectiveness of the EPA’s 
Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards, 33 J.L. & ECON. 331 
(1990) (discussing how water pollution inspection and enforcement have a strong effect on 
pollution and rates of compliance); Louis W. Nadeau, EPA Effectiveness at Reducing the 
Duration of Plant-Level Noncompliance, 34 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 54 (1997) 
(explaining that the EPA is effective at reducing the length of time plants are out of 
compliance). 
21 See SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 35–44 (2002). 
22 See Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to 
Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 549, 
554 (1996). 
23 See N. Craig Smith, Sally S. Simpson & Chun-Yao Huang, Why Managers Fail to Do 
the Right Thing: An Empirical Study of Unethical and Illegal Conduct, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 
633, 638–39 (2007). 
24 See Lori A. Elis & Sally S. Simpson, Informal Sanction Threats and Corporate 
Crime: Additive Versus Multiplicative Models, 32 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 399, 414–17 
(1995). 
25 See David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of 
Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 993–98 (2001). 
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rejects the economically rational conception of the firm and its managers 
found in command-and-control approaches to crime control.
26
  Instead, 
company self-regulation also accounts for the notion of organizational 
social responsibility and the prosocial norms and ethical values of company 
managers.  Thus, managers’ perceptions of the ethical climate of a firm 
should affect their own offending intentions. 
Evidence suggests that managers who believe that the corporate 
culture is tolerant of illegality are more likely to violate regulations.
27
  
Similarly, a recent meta-analysis found that ethics codes supported and 
enforced by top management have a positive, significant effect on ethical 
decisionmaking and conduct within companies.
28
  Research also indicates 
that a positive compliance culture at the firm level may be transmitted from 
a parent company to the plant level.
29
 
3. Informal Sanctions 
Informal sanctions (e.g., extralegal costs) are regulatory levers 
associated with both firm self-regulation and command-and-control 
strategies, depending on the mechanism that inhibits crime.  Negative 
publicity is a case in point.  Multiple sources of negative publicity can 
affect corporate (and manager) actions or outcomes, including: 
environmental activism,
30
 mandatory firm disclosure,
31
 or formal charges.
32
  
Generally, studies support the notion that bad environmental news affects a 
firm’s reputation and market performance.  However, the literature is mixed 
as to when in the legal process reputational damage is most salient (notice 




26 See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 8, at 133–40. 
27 See Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 22, at 556.  In addition, managers with lower 
ethical standards and managers ordered to do so are more likely to violate regulations.  See 
SIMPSON, supra note 21, at 41–42. 
28 Natalie Marie Schell-Busey, The Deterrent Effects of Ethics Codes for Corporate 
Crime: A Meta-Analysis 85 (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, 
College Park) (on file with Digital Repository at the University of Maryland, College Park). 
29 See Gray & Deily, supra note 20, at 100. 
30 See Neil Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why 
Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307, 318, 322 (2004); Robert 
A. Kagan et al., Explaining Corporate Environmental Performance: How Does Regulation 
Matter?, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51, 71–72 (2003). 
31 See Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information As Regulation: The Effect of 
Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109, 110 
(1997). 
32 See Wallace N. Davidson III et al., Stock Market Reactions to Announced Corporate 
Illegalities, 13 J. BUS. ETHICS 979, 985 (1994). 
33 Id. 
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whether stock prices are differentially responsive to civil, criminal, or 
regulatory moving agents;
34
 or even if negative stock reactions are best 
understood as “reputational” costs delivered by the market or costs 
primarily imposed by the legal community.
35
 
When reputational damages stem mainly from formal legal 
proceedings, this can be seen as part of a deterrence strategy.  However, 
informal sanctions also impose stigmatic, commitment, and attachment 
costs for managers who violate the law.
36
  These effects may be a direct 
consequence of formal sanctions
37
 or completely unrelated to formal 
proceedings.  In a study of corporate offending intentions, Elis and Simpson 
found inhibitory effects associated with the certainty of internally imposed 
informal sanctions (shame) and externally imposed informal sanctions (loss 
of respect from family, friends, and business associates).
38
  Importantly, the 
threat of both individual and firm reputational damage had an inhibitory 
effect.  But these effects were independent of and tended to trump formal 
sanction risks (which were relatively unimportant sources of deterrence). 
Although the literature is slim and contradictory, there is evidence that 
firm-level stigmatic consequences trickle down to responsible managers.
39
  
In a study of all SEC and DOJ enforcement actions brought between 
January 1978 and September 2006 against 788 firms in which financial 
misrepresentation occurred, Karpoff, Lee, and Martin report that 93% of all 
executives and 96% of other employees identified as legally responsible for 
the behavior were fired “for reasons that are directly related to their 
misconduct.”40  Job loss was more likely when misconduct was particularly 
costly to shareholders and when offenders faced strong governance 
 
34 See Bruce Mizrach & Susan Zhang Weerts, Does the Stock Market Punish Corporate 
Malfeasance? A Case Study of Citigroup, 3 CORP. OWNERSHIP & CONTROL 151, 153–54 
(2006) (serving as an example of how reputational consequences can flow from different 
moving agents). 
35 See Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Reputational Penalties for Environmental 
Violations: Empirical Evidence, 48 J.L. & ECON. 653, 665–68 (2005). 
36 See Raymond Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect of the Perceived Certainty and 
Severity of Punishment: A Review of the Evidence and Issues, 4 JUST. Q. 173, 210 (1987) 
(citing Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, Perceptual Research on General Detterence: 
A Critical Review, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 545, 568 (1986)). 
37 See Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, The Meaning of Arrest for Wife Assault, 27 
CRIMINOLOGY 163, 166 (1989). 
38 See Elis & Simpson, supra note 24, at 410–11. 
39 See Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate 
Crime: Evidence, 42 J.L. & ECON. 489, 523 (1999); Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to 
Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 605–07 (2008). 
40 Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Consequences to Managers for Financial 
Misrepresentation, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 204 (2008). 
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structures.
41
  From this literature, we expect that command-and-control as 
well as self-regulatory strategies will benefit from accounting for the 
informal stigmatic costs to the individual. 
B. RISK FACTORS FOR CORPORATE OFFENDING 
There are many different empirically identified “risk factors” for 
corporate crime.  These factors are important in our study because effective 
regulation should minimize the likelihood of criminal behavior in the face 
of pressures and predilections.  Below, we summarize some of the known 
risk factors for corporate environmental crime with the caveat that many of 
these same risk factors also are associated with offending by companies 
more generally. 
Looking first at firm characteristics, some research has found financial 
strain (measured in different ways) to significantly increase the likelihood 
that firms, plants, and managers will violate environmental laws and/or 
increase pollution levels.
42
  In vignette studies specifically, after controlling 
for individual-level predictors, managers are significantly more likely to 
engage in price-fixing, bribery, fraud, or EPA violations if the act will give 
the organization an edge over foreign competition or the act will result in 
substantial savings for the firm.
43
  When firm profits are slowing or 




In other studies, however, firm profit either is unrelated to 
environmental (and occupational health and safety) violations
45
 or has a 
positive effect on offending.
46
  Simpson, for example, finds that managers’ 
intentions to offend were higher when the firm was depicted as growing its 
sales.
47
  Thus, offending may be related to both financial decline and 
 
41 Id. at 194. 
42 See CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 4, at 128–29; Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. 
Cohen, New Evidence on the Origins of Corporate Crime, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION 
ECON. 421, 421 (1996); Kagan et al., supra note 30, at 51–90; Marie McKendall et al., 
Corporate Governance and Corporate Illegality: The Effects of Board Structure on 
Environmental Violations, 7 INT’L J. ORG. ANALYSIS 201, 203 (1999). 
43 See Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 22, at 557–59. 
44 See generally Neal Shover & Kevin M. Bryant, Theoretical Explanations of Corporate 
Crime, in UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE CRIMINALITY 141, 154 (Michael B. Blankenship ed., 
1993).  
45 See Charles W. L. Hill et al., An Empirical Examination of the Causes of Corporate 
Wrongdoing in the United States, 45 HUM. REL. 1055, 1070–71 (1992). 
46 See Marie A. McKendall & John A. Wagner, III, Motive, Opportunity, Choice, and 
Corporate Illegality, 8 ORG. SCI. 624, 625–26, 638 (1997). 
47 See SIMPSON, supra note 21, at 126. 
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growth.  Corporate observers suggest that a lack of predictability may 




The literature also predicts a link between intra-organizational 
structures and offending.  Within companies, decisions follow particular 
lines of communication and responsibility.  Managers have shown a 
tendency to obey authority, even when ordered to behave unethically or 
violate the law.
49
  This is true especially for middle-level managers who are 
responsible for carrying out orders but who have relatively little 
decisionmaking authority vis-à-vis top management.
50
 
Although organizational characteristics are often associated with 
corporate crime because they provide opportunity, context, or motivations 
for offending, as mentioned previously, managers—not companies—make 
decisions.  Managerial decisions might be affected by individual norms
51
 
and differences in traits such as impulsivity, hubris, desire for control, 
Machiavellianism, and self-serving bias.
52
  Although evidence on the link 
between corporate crime and low self-control
53
 is weak at best,
54
 empirical 
findings support an association between some of these other individual 




48 MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING 
INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS 324 (1980). 
49 HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY (1989). 
50 See MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE ETHICS AND CRIME: THE ROLE OF MIDDLE 
MANAGEMENT 21–23 (1983). 
51 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms 
in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 63–67 (2003). 
52 See Paul Babiak et al., Corporate Psychopathy: Talking the Walk, 28 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 
174, 190 (2010). 
53 See MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 
180–201 (1990) (discussing white-collar crime); Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, The 
Significance of White-Collar Crime for a General Theory of Crime, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 359, 
360–62 (1989). 
54 See WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 4, at 187–88; Michael L. Benson & Elizabeth 
Moore, Are White-Collar and Common Offenders the Same?: An Empirical and Theoretical 
Critique of a Recently Proposed General Theory of Crime, 29 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 251, 
260–63 (1992); Sally S. Simpson & Nicole Leeper Piquero, Low Self-Control, 
Organizational Theory, and Corporate Crime, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 509, 531–33 (2002). 
55 See Katherine A. DeCelles & Michael D. Pfarrer, Heroes or Villains? Corruption and 
the Charismatic Leader, 11 J. LEADERSHIP & ORGANIZATIONAL STUD. 67, 69–70 (2004); 
Matthew L. A. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large 
Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 103, 106–10 (1997); Nicole 
Leeper Piquero, M. Lyn Exum & Sally S. Simpson, Integrating the Desire-for-Control and 
Rational Choice in a Corporate Crime Context, 22 JUST. Q. 252, 268–72 (2005). 
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In sum, the body of evidence regarding the specific levers of corporate 
crime control is limited and inconclusive.  Importantly, little is known 
about how effective different regulatory strategies or components are in the 
context of known or suspected risk factors—both organizational and 
individual.  To address this issue, we rely on data drawn from a factorial 
survey administered to two samples of corporate employees.  The first 
sample includes corporate managers recruited as part of a National Institute 
of Justice (NIJ)-funded study on corporate environmental noncompliance.  
The second sample includes employees of public and private companies, 
drawn from a broader sample of the population.  Both sets of participants 
responded to web-based surveys that depicted two hypothetical scenarios 
designed to assess individuals’ propensity to engage in significant pollution 
violations (e.g., discharging toxins into waterways) and less serious 
environmental offenses (e.g., ignoring an EPA compliance order). 
III. METHODS 
Factorial surveys combine experimentally manipulated hypothetical 
scenarios (vignettes) with survey questions to measure respondents’ 
intentions, decisions, attitudes, or judgments.
56
  These designs, unlike more 
traditional survey techniques, allow researchers to manipulate a full range 
of circumstances that may affect a decision—essentially taking into account 
“the complexity and richness in the way people approach decisions and 
evaluations.”57  The design also avoids some of the temporal ordering and 
perceptual instability problems associated with other research designs.
58
  
Vignette surveys can be less threatening methods of data collection than 
self-report surveys when the subject matter is sensitive, such as when 
respondents are queried about unethical, criminal, or deviant behavior. 




56 See PETER HENRY ROSSI & STEVEN L. NOCK, MEASURING SOCIAL JUDGMENTS 9–13 
(1982). 
57 Edward D. Weber et al., The PC Vignette Generating Program (1988) (on file with the 
University of Massachusetts Social and Demographic Research Institute, Amherst, MA). 
58 See Linda Saltzman et al., Deterrent and Experiential Effects: The Problem of Causal 
Order in Perceptual Deterrence Research, 19 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 172, 174 (1982). 
59 In criminology, vignette studies were used to evaluate the appropriateness of corporate 
crime punishments, see Joan L. Miller et al., Felony Punishments: A Factorial Survey of 
Perceived Justice in Criminal Sentencing, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 396, 396–415 
(1991); public perceptions of white-collar crime seriousness, see James Frank et al., 
Sanctioning Corporate Crime: How Do Business Executives and the Public Compare?, 13 
AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 139, 139–41 (1989); and offending intentions, see Steven Klepper & 
Daniel Nagin, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment 
Revisited, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 721, 729 (1989); George Loewenstein et al., The Effect of 
Sexual Arousal on Expectations of Sexual Forcefulness, 34 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 443, 
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business to collect useful information about topics such as survey 
participation
60
 and consumer preferences,
61
 they also have some drawbacks.  
Critics have raised concerns about: the link between reported intentions and 
actual behavior and whether the relationship is sensitive to the respondent’s 
sex and the situation analyzed;
62
 the extent of social desirability bias in 
responses, especially in the constant-variable value vignettes where all 
respondents read identical scenarios;
63
 whether there are “order” effects;64 
and whether scenario-based research is valid and reliable;
65
 among other 
issues.  Poorly considered dimensions and components of the scenarios 
contribute to validity problems. 
In this study, to increase data validity, we draw extensively from the 
empirical and theoretical literatures to identify relevant attributes and levels 
for the vignettes.  We also asked environmental professionals and people in 
business to review drafts of the vignettes and the instrument was revised 
accordingly.
66
  We experimentally rotated vignette items within the 
scenario dimensions to lessen social desirability bias.  To minimize the 
biasing effect of vignette order, we randomly allocated items to respondents 
and asked them to imagine themselves in the position of the vignette 
actor.
67
  Order effects are more likely when respondents have little 
 
445 (1997); Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 22, at 558; N. Craig Smith et al., supra note 
23, at 645. 
60 See Robert M. Groves et al., A Laboratory Approach to Measuring the Effects on 
Survey Participation of Interview Length, Incentives, Differential Incentives, and Refusal 
Conversion, 15 J. OFFICIAL STAT. 251 (1999). 
61 See Alice Grønhøj & Tino Bech-Larsen, Using Vignettes to Study Family 
Consumption Processes, 27 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 445 (2010). 
62 See Stefanie Eifler, Evaluating the Validity of Self-Reported Deviant Behavior Using 
Vignette Analyses, 41 QUALITY & QUANTITY 303, 306–10 (2007); M. Lyn Exum et al, Self-
Reported Intentions to Offend: All Talk and No Action?, 37 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 523, 534 
(2011). 
63 See generally Gerald. F. Cavanaugh & David J. Fritzsche, Using Vignettes in Business 
Ethics Research, in 7 RESEARCH IN CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND POLICY 279–93 
(Lee E. Preston ed., 1985); Maria F. Fernandes & Donna M. Randall, The Nature of Social 
Desirability Response Effects in Ethics Research, 2 BUS. ETHICS Q. 183 (1992). 
64 See Katrin Auspurg & Annette Jäckle, First Equals Most Important?: Order Effects in 
Vignette-Based Measurement 19–20 (Inst. for Soc. and Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
2012-01). 
65 See Stefanie Eifler, Validity of a Factorial Survey Approach to the Analysis of 
Criminal Behavior, 6 METHODOLOGY 139, 140 (2010); James Weber, Scenarios in Business 
Ethics Research: Review, Critical Assessment, and Recommendations, 2 BUS. ETHICS Q. 
137, 145–46 (1992). 
66 See Kelly D. Wason et al., Designing Vignette Studies in Marketing, 10 
AUSTRALASIAN MARKETING J. 41, 53 (2002). 
67 See id. at 41–43. 
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knowledge or care little about the topic.
68
  Our study explicitly sampled 
environmental experts (discussed below), and we asked respondents to 
report on their experiences with and attitudes about depicted behaviors as 
part of the survey.  Although the jury is still out, research also has shown a 
reasonable correlation between reported intentions and behavior.
69
  Given 
the sensitive subject matter (corporate offending) as well as our attention to 
methodological concerns in the design of the instrument, we believe the 
factorial survey method is a reasonable and valid approach to our research 
question. 
A. SCENARIO CONSTRUCTION 
One of the first steps in factorial survey construction is to determine 
the “domain” of the judgment or decision.  The vignette domain consists of 
dimensions believed to affect the manager’s decision to engage in corporate 
offending.  Guided by a modified rational choice theory
70
 and the corporate 
crime empirical literature, a number of pushes and pulls toward crime at the 
individual and corporate level are incorporated into the vignette design.  
Scenarios are created from rotated elements or levels within dimensions.  
To illustrate, the firm’s environmental constraints (one dimension) provide 
contextual information to the respondent about the economic environment 
in which the company is conducting its business.  The type of constraint 
(e.g., the industry is losing ground to foreign competitors, the industry is 
economically healthy, the industry is economically deteriorating) is 
randomly assigned to each scenario.  Further, management level is an intra-
organizational dimension empirically linked to offending decisions.  
Pressures on middle managers to achieve corporate goals—often with the 
implicit message “by any means necessary”71—and unrealistic performance 
metrics
72
 create a greater likelihood of corporate crime by midlevel 
managers compared with top management (who generally set company 
goals and strategies for others to achieve).  Research has also found that 
managers adhere to authority structures within firms.
73
  The probability of 
 
68 Auspurg & Jäckle, supra note 64, at 1. 
69 See Greg Pogarsky, Projected Offending and Contemporaneous Rule-Violation: 
Implications for Heterotypic Continuity, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 111, 115 (2004); Harry Telser & 
Peter Zweifel, Validity of Discrete-Choice Experiments Evidence for Health Risk Reduction, 
39 APPLIED ECON. 69, 72–75 (2007). 
70 See Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 22, at 553–57. 
71 CLINARD, supra note 50, at 22–23. 
72 John Braithwaite, White-Collar Crime, Competition, and Capitalism: Comment on 
Coleman,  94 AM. J. SOC. 627, 629 (1988). 
73 Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton, Distributing Responsibility for Wrongdoing Inside 
Corporate Hierarchies: Public Judgments in Three Societies, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 815, 
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corporate crime is higher for those managers affirmatively instructed to 
break a given rule.  Thus, we varied the “locus of control” in the scenarios 
based on whether or not the employee was ordered by a superior to commit 
the offense.  Finally, the ethical tone and culture of a company can affect 
how managers perceive corporate crime (as acceptable or not) which, in 
turn, may increase or decrease the anticipated rewards/costs of offending.  
Dimensions that rotate levels of managerial ethics, firm volunteerism, and 
internal compliance systems also are randomized within the scenarios.  The 
specific dimensions of interest (and randomized levels within each) for this 
Article are listed in Appendix I. 
The survey instrument contains two “offending” vignettes.  One 
noncompliance scenario describes a technical violation (e.g., failure to 
act/comply with an environmental agency’s order) with no indication of 
whether it will affect pollution levels.  The other depicts a more substantial 
pollution event (the intentional release of a toxic substance into a local 
waterway) that exceeds permitted levels by 200%.  Sample scenarios can be 
found in Appendix II.  The vignettes are followed by a series of questions 
that relate to a specific scenario, general questions that measure 
respondents’ opinions and beliefs, and requests for demographic/work 
information about the respondent and his/her current employer. 
B. SURVEY ADMINISTRATION 
As noted previously, the factorial survey was first pretested, 
redesigned, and then vetted with environmental scholars, regulators, and 
executives.  The instrument was modified to address any remaining 
concerns and adopted to be administered using a web-based Internet site.  
Data collection occurred in two waves.  The survey first was administered 
in companies that were part of a larger NIJ-funded grant.
74
  The original 
research assessed patterns of environmental offending and company 
responses to governmental interventions (regulatory, civil, or criminal).  An 
additional goal was to look inside the black box of the corporation by 
studying managers’ perceptions of corporate environmental crime and learn 
about their decisionmaking processes.  All firms (whether participants in 
the vignette survey or not) were drawn from a sample of U.S.-owned 
companies in three basic manufacturing industries (steel, pulp and paper, 
and oil refining).  These firms owned manufacturing sites that were 
designated by the EPA as “major” facilities.75  Of the forty-eight firms 
 
853 (1997). 
74 See SIMPSON ET AL., supra note 19. 
75 Whether a facility is deemed “major” or not is determined by the facility’s volume and 
type of wastewater, as well as its potential for discharging toxic wastes.  See Peter C. 
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contacted to participate in this study, only three companies agreed to send 
the survey out to their employees.  Due to technical difficulties associated 
with survey administration, one firm asked to withdraw from the project 
after data had been collected.  Thus, respondents for the study are 
concentrated in two participating companies—one in the steel industry and 
the other in pulp and paper. 
The low rate of participation raises concerns of bias in the data.  For 
example, if ethical firms were more likely to participate, our results may 
underestimate the likelihood of offending and the relationship between it 
and key independent variables.  To assess potential bias, we compared each 
participating company’s average size (number of facilities owned, number 
of employees), market value (total stockholders’ equity), compliance (total 
violations, violation rate per number of facilities), and enforcement record 
(total sanctions, total inspections, inspection rate per number of facilities) to 
the seventy-one nonparticipants.
76
  The values for each company were taken 
by averaging six years of data (1995–2000).  We do not provide 
significance tests due to the small sample size for participants (N = 2).  One 
participating company is much larger and has a higher market value than 
the average company in the sample.  It also has a better record of 
compliance, including a lower violation rate (.43 standard deviations below 
the mean for nonparticipating companies).  The second participant is also 
somewhat larger than the average company, but has a record of compliance 
very similar to that of nonparticipating companies (.01 standard deviations 
below the mean for nonparticipating companies).  Such firm-level 
variability gives us confidence that responding managers come from 
corporate environments with different environmental records—one better 
than and one comparable to the “typical” nonparticipating firm in the NIJ 
sample. 
Fifty-four respondents from one company and sixteen participants 
from another reported on their willingness to engage in the noncompliant 
behaviors described in both scenario types, producing 140 scenarios.  An 
additional fourteen participants reported their behavioral intentions for one 
scenario.  This produced 154 cases for potential analysis.  After listwise 
deletion of independent variables, 126 cases from seventy respondents were 




Yeager, Industrial Water Pollution, 18 CRIME & JUST. 97, 122 n.37 (1993). 
76 See infra Appendix III, Table 1. 
77 For both samples, only seventeen people who received both scenarios failed to 
respond to both (fourteen in the NIJ sample; three in the TMone sample).  Because eleven of 
these are missing additional data, these respondents ultimately are excluded from further 
analysis.  Not surprisingly, after dropping those who completed only one scenario from the 
analysis and comparing the results with the full sample, there are no significant observed 
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Recognizing that respondents in the NIJ study were drawn from a 
limited sample of large manufacturers, our goal in the second study was to 
target a broader set of business managers and gain a larger pool of 
respondents than in the first study.
78
  We also preferred potential 
respondents to have some knowledge about environmental statutes and 
compliance requirements.  Accordingly we obtained a list of 7,292 
environmental decisionmakers within a wide variety of organizations in the 
United States from TMone, a company that provides targeted databases for 
direct mail campaigns.  The sampling frame list contained the individual’s 
name as well as information about the entity for which he worked,  
including the organization’s name, address, telephone number, and 
webpage (if applicable). 
From December 2008 to March 2009, Vanderbilt University sent 
letters to potential respondents on the list indicating their selection for 
survey participation.  The letters also provided a link to the web-based 
factorial survey.  Of the 7,292 sent, 1,373 letters were returned as 
undeliverable, leaving us with a potential sample pool of 5,919.  To 
increase response rates, Vanderbilt researchers sent out follow-up postcards 
about three weeks after the initial letter was sent (from January 2009 to 
April 2009).  Seven hundred seventeen individuals logged into the survey 
site, for a response rate of about 12%.
79
  This response rate is not atypical of 
that seen in previous studies on web-based surveys.
80
  Low response rates 
 
differences. 
78 There were a few minor changes between the two survey instruments.  When 
applicable, differences between items are noted in the text. 
79 We received about thirty contacts from individuals about the surveys, including 
reasons for participating or not participating in the survey.  Most of the contacts who 
indicated they would not be responding to the survey mentioned a lack of technical 
proficiency or not owning a computer.  Many who reported not owning a computer were 
also retired.  Some mentioned that they simply were not interested or that they did not feel 
like they were appropriate respondents because of their current jobs or work experiences 
(e.g., did not see themselves as environmental experts).  We provided technical assistance to 
individuals who wanted to respond to the survey but had trouble accessing the website, and 
encouraged those who felt they were inappropriately contacted to respond with the 
understanding that we would consider their job description and experience when interpreting 
results. 
80 See generally Stephen R. Porter & Michael E. Whitcomb, The Impact of Contact Type 
on Web Survey Response Rates, 67 PUB. OPINION Q. 579, 583–84 (2003) (comparing 
different types of contacts and showing that response rates are relatively low regardless of 
delivery condition); Ashok Ranchhod & Fan Zhou, Comparing Respondents of E-mail and 
Mail Surveys: Understanding the Implications of Technology, 19 MARKETING INTELLIGENCE 
& PLANNING 254 (2001).  Scholars have long noted that web-based surveys have certain 
features that reduce the likelihood of response.  For instance, researchers cannot include 
tangible incentives that can increase participation (e.g., pens, stickers), the formatting of web 
surveys may make the questionnaire appear longer and less professional, respondents may 
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do not necessarily equate to nonresponse bias.  If respondent characteristics 
are similar to nonrespondent characteristics, then the survey responses can 
reasonably be attributed to the larger target sample.
81
  To assess 
nonresponse bias, we took a random sample of 500 individuals from the 
5,919 who received the invitation to participate.  For each of these 500 
people, we gathered additional information regarding the type of 
organization (publicly or privately owned corporation, government agency, 
NGO or civic association, law firm, private consulting firm, or other) and 
the type of profession (environmentally related or not), the size of the 
entity, and the gender of the individual.  As shown in Appendix III (Table 
2), we compared respondents to nonrespondents on these four dimensions, 
and found that the only significant difference between the two groups was 
organization size.  Respondents came from slightly larger organizations 
(mean = 14.04 employees) than nonparticipants (mean = 9.59 employees).
82
  
However, the similarities on the other dimensions suggest nonresponse may 
not be a major problem.  Even so, we are cautious with our interpretation 
and extrapolation of findings. 
C. RESPONDENT INFORMATION 
Merging the two sets of respondents yields a total of 237 scenarios 
from 161 individuals.
83
   
 
feel that data integrity is not secure, and technical issues may affect responsivity.  See id. at 
254–56; Linda J. Sax et al., Assessing Response Rates and Nonresponse Bias in Web and 
Paper Surveys, 44 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 409 (2003). 
81 Sax et al., supra note 80, at 409–32. 
82 The range on this variable is 1 to 370 employees.  Although statistically significant, 
we question whether this is a meaningful difference.  Both means are on the small side and if 
we round 9.59 up to 10, both responders and nonparticipants fall within the same business 
size classification according to the U.S. Census.  Statistics About Business Size, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html. 
83 For comparison purposes, the demographic characteristics of each sample are shown 
in Table 1, infra.  As these descriptions demonstrate, our strategy to get a broader range of 
respondents in the TMone sample was successful. 
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Table 1 
Demographics and Perceptions of Company  
Environmental Strategies, by Sample 
 NIJ Sample  
(N = 70) 
TMone Sample  
(N = 91) 
Total Sample 
(N = 161) 
Marital Status 94% married 80% married 85% married 
Gender 93% male 79% male 84% male 
Age Mean = 45.99 Mean = 54.47 Mean = 50.49 
Education    
     HS degree or    




     Some college 5.48% 30.21% 20.00% 
     4-year college degree 57.53% 5.21% 26.67% 
     Some graduate study 13.70% 1.04% 6.11% 
     Graduate degree 20.55% 6.25% 11.67% 
Involvement with environmental decisionmaking  
     Not involved 4.29% 4.17% 4.38% 
     Somewhat involved 28.57% 10.42% 18.13% 
     Routinely involved 67.14% 85.42% 77.50% 
Management experience    
     Years working for  
     current employer 
Mean = 18.78 Mean = 13.87 Mean = 16.12 
     Years of business  
     experience 
Mean = 23.34 Mean = 30.84 Mean = 27.39 









 Environmental commitment of respondent’s firm  
     Excessive 10.00% 9.28% 9.54% 
     About right 88.57% 88.66% 88.60% 
     Could use work 1.43% 2.06% 1.86% 
     Poor 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Compliance systems in respondent’s company  
     Code of ethics 100% 63% 80% 
     Mandatory ethics  
     training 
91% 20% 51% 
     Random audits 26% 4% 14% 
     Anonymous hotline 99% 10% 49% 
     Corporate environ.       
     mgmt. system or  
     company policy
85  
99% 38% -- 
     Top mgmt. treats ethics   
     and violations seriously 
91% 60% 65% 
 
84 The two samples received different response choices to the question, “What is your 
management level?” 
85 
The two samples received different questions about company policy.  The NIJ sample 
was asked, “Does your current employer have [a] Corporate Environmental Management 
System?”  The TMone sample was asked whether their company had a “[c]ompany policy 
regarding environmental compliance management systems in relevant business sites.” 
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As reported in Table 1, the average respondent is about fifty years of 
age.  Most are married (85%) and male (84%), and a substantial majority 
attended college or graduate school (64%).  They are experienced and loyal 
workers, with an average career length of twenty-seven years, sixteen of 
which have been with their current employer.  About 78% report being 
routinely involved with environmental decisionmaking in their respective 
companies.  Most respondents have a positive assessment of their firms’ 
ethical commitments.  Sixty-five percent of the respondents report that top 
management treats ethics and violations seriously, and 89% report that the 
environmental commitment of their firm is just right.  There is more 
variation in the kinds of ethics training and compliance systems utilized by 
their firms.  About 80% of respondents report the presence of a code of 
ethics in their workplace, 51% report mandatory ethics training, 14% report 




1. Dependent Variable 
After reading each scenario, respondents were asked to rate how likely 
they were to act like the manager in the scenario (0 = no chance at all to 10 
= 100% chance), who in both scenarios always engages in noncompliant 
behavior.  Therefore the dependent variable measures the respondent’s 
willingness or intention to act illegally.  Intentions are not distributed 
equally across vignette types; individuals were much less likely to offend 
when given the “significant noncompliance” scenario than when they were 
given the “technical noncompliance” scenario.  Specifically, in the 113 
EPA-order-defiance scenarios, 57.5% (N = 65) of the respondents reported 
no chance of offending.  In comparison, 102 out of the 124 (82.3%) of the 
respondents to the toxic-release scenario reported no chance of offending.  
 
86 This seems fairly typical for major corporations.  A recent LRN ethics study, for 
instance, found eight out of ten employees reporting that their organization has a written 
code of conduct or ethics.  Moreover, a large percent (83%) also say that their management 
“genuinely” wants to promote integrity and ethics in the organization.  LRN CORP.,  THE 
IMPACT OF CODES OF CONDUCT ON CORPORATE CULTURE 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/LRNImpactofCodesofConduct.pdf.  The code of ethics or 
code of conduct is the most common part of the compliance infrastructure and hotlines are 
also fairly common.  Highly regulated industries tend to have more detailed compliance 
structures.  DONNA BOEHME, FROM ENRON TO MADOFF: WHY MOST CORPORATE 
COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAMS ARE POSITIONED FOR FAILURE 28 (2009), available at 
http://compliancestrategists.net/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/Rand1.pdf.  We expected 
and found the NIJ respondents (steel; pulp and paper) to report more extensive systems than 
the TMone sample. 
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Combined, 167 out of the 237 (70.5%) scenarios in the total survey had a 
“no chance of offending” outcome reported. 87  Given the obvious positive 
skew on offending overall as well as by scenario type, we recoded the 
dependent variable to a binary outcome (0 = unwilling to act like the 
manager in the scenario; 1 = 10% or more chance of acting like the 
manager in the scenario and engaging in illegal behavior).
88
 
2. Independent Variables 
The independent variables can be sorted into three main categories: 
relevant control variables, individual/corporate risk factors for offending, 
and variables that capture some aspect of regulation (command-and-control, 
firm self-regulation).  Variables are drawn from the vignettes themselves,
89
 
questions that follow each survey, and demographic information reported 
by respondents.  Each class of variables is described briefly below. 
i. Controls 
Although there are a number of potential control variables to include 
in this analysis, we focused primarily on variables that had a significant 
bivariate relationship with the dependent variable
90
 or affected offending 
intentions in preliminary analyses, once other variables were included in the 
models.  Questions ask respondents to assess scenario realism (0 = not 
realistic, 1 = realistic) and to rate the desirability of the behavior (0 = not at 
all desirable to 10 = very desirable) and how likely the manager’s actions 
were to endanger human life and wildlife (0 = no chance at all to 10 = 
100% chance).  We also included measures that controlled for: (1) the 
respondent’s years of business experience; (2) whether the respondent had 




87 Only people with no missing data are included in our analysis.  Consequently, we do 
not lose any cases across models. 
88 Alternative coding strategies for the dependent variable (0–10) and analyses (OLS and 
Tobit) were conducted to assess whether the binary coding scheme is defensible.  Results are 
substantively the same as those reported with only minor observed differences (results 
available on request).  Because our primary interest in this study is to determine whether 
certain interventions minimize the likelihood of offending, it made sense for us to truncate 
all positive responses into a binary 0/1 coding scheme. 
89 Vignette characteristics entered into the models are dummy variables scored as 1 if the 
characteristic was present in the scenario and 0 if it was not included.  The choice of the 
reference category is determined by theory and ease of interpretation. 
90 See infra Table 2. 
91 The two samples received slightly different versions of this question—the NIJ sample 
was asked whether they had personal experience with or knew about any of the scenarios 
presented in the same question while the TMone sample was only asked about personal 
experience with each scenario.  Further, we could not distinguish which of the specific 
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(3) scenario type (technical noncompliance versus release of toxins); and 
(4) whether the respondent was part of the NIJ sample (coded as 1) or the 
TMone sample (coded as 0). 
ii. Risk Factors 
Individual-level factors 
The corporate crime literature has identified several individual-level 
characteristics that might confound the relationship between prevention-
and-control strategies and offending intentions.  Our respondents were 
asked several questions that tap into some of these attributes.  Personal self-
interest was measured by two questions about perceived career benefits 
from the crime (crude measures of Machiavellianism) and the level of 
excitement associated with illegal behavior (respondents rated both on 11-
point scales where higher scores indicated greater perceived benefits).
92
  
We expect that respondents who perceive more career benefits and greater 
thrills will report higher offending intentions.  The risk of crime also should 
be greater when managers do not believe in the common value system 
represented by the law.  Social control theory, for instance, asserts “there is 
variation in the extent to which people believe they should obey the rules of 
society . . . .  [T]he less a person believes he should obey the rules, the more 
likely he is to violate them.”93  To examine this, we asked respondents their 
degree of agreement with the following statement: “Individuals should 
comply with the law so long as it does not go against what s/he thinks is 
right.”  Agreement with such a statement suggests that the respondent does 
not share conventional attitudes about the moral authority of law and is 
therefore at greater risk for offending. 
Company-level factors 
Risks associated with the company are captured in two types of 
measures: economic constraints on the firm and managerial position and 
authority.  In the vignettes, respondents assessed scenario conditions 
 
vignettes the NIJ sample had personal experience with or knew about.  Thus, for both 
samples, this variable reflects personal experience or knowledge about any of the 
environmental situations presented, including overcompliance scenarios (not discussed in 
this paper).  Although the NIJ sample is more likely to report having personal 
experience/hearing about these behaviors (mean = 0.896) than the TMone sample (mean = 
0.577), this result may be due to the more inclusive nature of the NIJ question than a true 
difference in personal experience. 
92 The distribution of the “perceived thrills” variable is skewed to the right, with 197 out 
of 237 responses at 0 (out of a possible 10).  The mean of this variable is 0.43.  We 
examined all six models using a dichotomous version of the variable, but results were 
substantively the same.  We therefore report the results using the full 10-point scale. 
93 TRAVIS HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY 26 (1969). 
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wherein the firm was depicted as economically deteriorating, economically 
healthy, or losing ground to foreign competition.  In addition, research has 
shown that a manager’s location within the company affects offending risk 
as pressures are often placed on middle managers to meet performance 
goals regardless of whether these goals can be achieved within the 
constraints of the law.  Similarly, offending risks are also tied to whether 
managers are in a position to compel others to act illegally.  So manager 
level (middle and upper) and decisionmaking authority (asked by 
supervisor to act versus made an independent decision) are included as 




Several vignette dimensions are important indicators of company self-
regulation.  For example, scenarios contained information about whether 
the depicted company participated (or not) in voluntary EPA pollution-
reduction programs; the kind of internal compliance system at the firm (a 
range from mandatory training through mandatory self-reporting of 
releases); whether ethics typically guide decisionmaking in the firm; and 
the consequences for managers who were discovered by the company to be 
behaving in similar activities (graduated consequences from no 
consequence at all to the employee was fired). 
Informal Sanction Risk 
We also created a standardized scale that takes into account the 
perceived certainty and severity of three business-related informal sanctions 
directed at the individual.  Variables include the perceived likelihood and 
cost of losing the respect of business associates, loss of job, and future harm 
to job prospects if the behavior was discovered informally.  This scale also 
incorporates a measure of respondents’ perceptions regarding the likelihood 




Command and Control 
After each scenario, respondents were asked to evaluate the adequacy 
 
94 Prior to standardization, scores can range from 0 to 3000.  After centering, the range is 
from 1.889 to 1.699.  Preliminary analysis revealed a significant difference between 
samples.  TMone respondents perceive lower risks (mean = 1321.113) than do NIJ 
respondents (mean = 1812.02).  However, the biserial correlations between the informal 
sanctions scale and the outcome are similar for the two samples.  The biserial correlation 
between informal business sanctions and offending decisions are NIJ rpb = -0.38, p < .01; 
TMone rpb = -0.36, p < 0.01; merged sample rpb = - 0.39, p < .01.  There is no evidence of 
outliers affecting this relationship. 
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(0 = too strict to 10 = too lenient) of the laws governing the behavior 
described in the scenario.
95
  In addition, five questions focused on the 
respondents’ perceptions of the formal costs of offending for the individual 
actor.  The responses to these five questions were combined to form a 
formal sanction scale.
96
  The scale takes into account both respondents’ 
perceptions of the likelihood that a given negative outcome (e.g., being 
arrested, sued, or investigated by a regulatory agency) will result from the 
manager’s actions (i.e., certainty) and how much of a problem the negative 
outcome would cause for the respondent (i.e., severity).  Certainty (0 = no 
chance at all to 10 = 100% chance) and severity (0 = no problem at all to 10 
= a very big problem) were measured on an 11-point scale.
97
 
IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Table 2 reports on bivariate relationships between reported offending 
intentions and the key independent regulatory variables of interest.   
 
95 Contradictory findings may emerge from this variable.  Consistent with deterrence, the 
risk of offending should be low if law is perceived to be punitive.  However, procedural 
justice and defiance theory would predict greater offending risk if law is perceived to be 
“overly strict,” since this may tap into perceptions that law is unfair and illegitimate.  See 
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1993); Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, 
Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the Criminal Sanction, 30 J. RES. CRIME & 
DELINQ. 445 (1993). 
96 The construction of these scales is discussed in more detail (as are other variables) in 
Appendix IV. 
97 This excludes regulatory investigation, which only has direct implications for the firm.  
We calculated the scale in the following manner: Individual Formal Sanction Risk = 
(Certainty of criminal * Severity of criminal) + (Certainty of civil * Severity of civil).  
Certainty = the certainty of outcomes [arrest (criminal); being personally sued (civil)]; and 
Severity = the perceived severity of those outcomes. 
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Several of the relationships were significant and in the predicted 
direction.  For instance, informal sanctions were negatively related to 
managerial intentions (offending propensity, rpb = -.386, p < .01).  
Managers who perceived substantial discovery costs were less apt to violate 
the law.  Similarly, intentions were inhibited when managers were depicted 
as being reprimanded within the company for engaging in similar acts (Ф = 
-.137, p < .05) and when formal sanctions were perceived as likely (rpb =  
-.280, p < .001).  Conversely, reported offending was more likely when 
companies had mandatory ethics training as part of an internal compliance 
system (Ф = .134, p < .05).  As respondents’ assessments of environmental 
law moved toward overly harsh or punitive, crime propensity increased 
slightly (rpb = -.124, p < .10), suggesting a potential defiance effect. 
Our bivariate correlations also revealed significant relationships 
between risk factors, especially those measured at the individual level, and 
offending propensity.  Illegal intentions increased when the act was thought 
to be thrilling (rpb = .290, p < .001) or likely to bring career benefits 
(rpb = .352, p < .001).  Consistent with our social-control argument, 
offending appears more likely when belief in the moral authority of the law 
is variable (rpb = .163, p < .01).  Most situational risk factors that capture 
firm-level processes (e.g., management level, economic constraints, and 
foreign competition) were not significantly correlated with offending with 
the exception of our measure of authority structure.  Reported offending is 
more likely under the condition of a supervisor’s request (i.e., asked by 
one’s supervisor to act illegally, Ф = .142, p < .05). 
As previously noted, our dependent variable is a dichotomous outcome 
so logistic regression is used to assess variable relationships.  To enhance 
statistical power, the two scenarios are combined and analyzed together.
98
  
Therefore, the majority of people contribute two responses to each set of 
analyses and the observations are not independent of one another, which is 
a key assumption of multivariate regression.  When this assumption is 
violated, coefficient estimates will be consistent (i.e., unbiased), but 
standard errors are no longer valid.
99
  For this reason, we estimate robust 
standard errors using the Huber/White/sandwich estimator to take into 




98 We considered whether combining the outcomes made sense analytically as well as 
statistically.  Logically, it seems reasonable to couple the illegal behaviors since both violate 
legal requirements or standards, albeit by different degrees.  We statistically control for 
offense type in our models. 
99 SOPHIA RABE-HESKETH & ANDERS SKRONDAL, MULTILEVEL AND LONGITUDINAL 
MODELING USING STATA 34 (2005). 
100 An alternative method for handling lack of independence between observations is to 
estimate a random effects model, which allows the intercept to vary across individuals.  
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Our logistic regression analysis proceeds in stages.
101
  In the first 
stage, we examine the effect of firm and individual risk factors on 
offending intentions (including control variables).  In the next model, we 
add the effects of informal sanctions.  We know from the social control and 
deterrence literatures that informal sanctions may operate independently to 
inhibit offending, but informal sanctions may also be triggered as a 
consequence of internal compliance structures or by command-and-control 
interventions.  Therefore, it is important first to examine informal sanctions 
separately from other regulatory elements.  Our third model includes 
company self-regulation variables without informal sanctions.  This enables 
us both to assess whether elements of this control strategy affect 
willingness to violate and to examine if the effects of the risk factors are 
mitigated by the addition of these variables.  Our fourth model combines 
company self-regulation and informal sanctions.  The fifth model 
substitutes the command-and-control measures for the self-regulation and 
informal sanctions variables.  Finally, we estimate a full model including 
both firm self-regulation and command-and-control measures to assess how 
these strategies operate simultaneously.
102
  For the sake of brevity, we have 
 
While estimating robust standard errors treats the correlation among time-varying variables 
as a nuisance, random effects models explicitly model the lack of dependence and 
decompose the total residual into between- and within-individual components.  Id. at 74.  
Given that our research question does not require us to estimate the size of the between- and 
within-person error terms, we chose to use the simpler statistical method that requires the 
estimation of fewer parameters. 
101 To assess whether we could combine data from the two samples, we selected 
variables that were significant in the regression models for the merged sample and 
conducted separate analyses by sample source.  As shown in Appendix V, there are notable 
differences between samples.  For instance, offending intentions are decreased for TMone 
respondents for the major pollution event (compared with defying an EPA order) and when 
informal sanction threats are high.  Intentions increase when the act is perceived as thrilling.  
Among NIJ respondents, intentions are lessened when managers perceive the risk of formal 
sanctions to be high and consequential but increased when the depicted behavior is viewed 
as desirable and beneficial to the respondent’s career.  Although different variables are 
significant for the two samples, the signs for the coefficients are similar across samples and 
results are consistent with extant literature.  Therefore, we have decided to merge the 
samples to enhance statistical power.  Future research would benefit from exploring how risk 
and protective factors as well as the success of prevention-and-control strategies may vary 
by company or industry characteristics.  That particular question is beyond the scope of this 
research. 
102 We conduct a total of 145 hypothesis tests (including controls).  Given this large 
number of tests, we would expect seven significant results to occur by chance alone.  Our 
results, however, reveal forty-nine significant relationships (including controls)—
substantially more than would be expected by chance.  Moreover, these findings are 
consistent with extant empirical and theoretical expectations. 
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Regression of Behavioral Intentions on Risk Factors, Regulatory 
Components, and Relevant Control Variables
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Risk Factors 
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Informal Sanctions 
Model 3:  
Self-Regulation 
 
 B (Robust SE) B (Robust SE) B (Robust SE) 
 Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio 
Constant 1.21 (.92) 0.23 (1.00) 2.67 (1.34)** 
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103 Several of our control variables are significantly associated with willingness to 
violate environmental regulations.  Individuals are less willing to violate regulations when 
the noncompliance is of a more significant nature (i.e., releasing toxins vs. ignoring a 
compliance order) and when they perceive that there is a greater likelihood that the behavior 
will endanger human life or wildlife.  They are more willing to violate when they view the 
behavior as more desirable.  In addition, individuals who report more business experience 
are marginally less willing to violate environmental law.  It is important to note, however, 
that several control variables have no effect in the model.  Scenario realism does not affect 
offending intentions, nor does sample origin (NIJ) or personal experience/knowledge of acts 
depicted in scenarios.  This latter null finding, which is consistent across all of our models, is 
surprising considering the argument that “decisions from experience and decisions from 
description can lead to dramatically different choice behavior.”  Ralph Hertwig et al., 
Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events in Risky Choice, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
534, 534 (2004). 
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.35 .31 .36 .37 
Note: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
Note:  + Control variables are removed from the tables and reported in Appendix VI. 
a In model 7, “career” and “informal sanctions” were mean centered to ease interpretability of 
coefficients. 
Our main findings are reported in Table 3.  As shown in model 1, the 
decision to violate is related to instrumental considerations.  Specifically, 
individuals are more willing to violate when they believe this behavior will 
advance their careers and when they perceive such behavior to be more 
thrilling.  For each unit increase in the respondent’s estimate that the 
behavior will advance the manager’s career, the odds that the respondent 
would be willing to violate environmental regulations increase by almost 
26%.  For every unit increase in perceived thrills, the odds of being willing 
to offend increased by about 53%.  None of the firm-level risk factors 
examined are significantly related to willingness to violate. 
In the second model, we add the informal sanctions scale.  Informal 
sanctions exert a strong inhibiting effect on offending; individuals who 
perceive the informal costs associated with violating environmental law to 
be more certain and severe are significantly less willing to violate.  For 
every unit increase in perceived business-related informal costs, the odds of 
being willing to offend decrease by 62%.  It is also noteworthy that the 
effect of perceived danger to life becomes nonsignificant when informal 
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sanctions are included in the model.
104
  The two variables are modestly 
correlated (r = .315); thus, it appears our respondents believe informal costs 
are higher for acts they perceive as more dangerous. 
Model 3 includes our variables capturing elements of company self-
regulation.  None of the self-regulation variables significantly affect 
offending intentions, nor do they mitigate the effect of the individual- and 
firm-level risk factors.  Directionally, however, most of the variables 
operate in a predictable manner (except for mandatory ethics training and 
an anonymous hotline).  Notice that the inhibitory effect of danger to life on 
offending intentions becomes significant once again in this model.
105
 
Next, we examine the effect of including firm self-regulation variables 
and perceived informal sanctions (model 4).  The results are substantively 
the same as the previous two models, with the firm self-regulation variables 
remaining nonsignificant while informal sanctions exert a strongly 
significant influence (odds of being willing to offend decrease 60% for 
every unit increase in perceived informal costs).  The previously significant 
risk and control variables remain so in model 4 with the exception of 




In model 5, we examine variables capturing command-and-control 
regulatory techniques, controlling for individual- and firm-level risk factors.  
Individuals who believe that they will face more certain and severe formal 
sanctions are significantly less willing to violate environmental 
regulations.
107
  A one-unit increase in the formal sanctions costs scale 
decreases the probability that the respondent is willing to violate 
environmental regulations by about 54%.  In contrast, the perceived 
adequacy of the law governing the violating behavior is unrelated to 
willingness to violate the law.  Several of the individual- and firm-level risk 
factors remain significant in this model.  For instance, neither career 
advancement nor thrill of the act is mitigated by formal sanction risk in this 
model.  However, this is the first model in which being asked to offend by 
 
104 See infra Appendix VI. 
105 See infra Appendix VI. 
106 See infra Appendix VI. 
107 We also examined the effects of formal sanctions directed at the firm (criminal, civil, 
and regulatory sanction certainty and severity), but found that they were highly collinear 
with the individual-level formal sanctions variable.  When both scales were included in the 
model, neither achieved statistical significance.  When entering the variables separately, 
individual-level sanctions exhibited a stronger and more consistent effect on offending 
(reflecting the notion that managers may be more concerned with formal sanctions directed 
at themselves) than did firm-level formal sanctions.  Therefore, the decision was made to 
drop firm-level sanctions from the analysis. 
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one’s supervisor increases the propensity likelihood.  Although the odds of 
offending are 95% higher for those who have been asked to offend by a 
superior versus those who have not, the effect is only marginally significant 
(p < .10).  Regarding the control variables (Appendix VI), the crime-
reduction effect associated with the perceived danger of the act (whether 
the respondent believes that the behavior will endanger human life or 
wildlife) is not significant here, a result we saw in the informal sanctions 
models as well.  The measure of formal sanctions is correlated with 
perceived danger (r = 0.493), implying that formal sanctions (like informal 
sanctions) may be redundant with perceptions of danger.  The effects of 
other controls in the model remain consistent. 
In the full model depicted in Table 3 (model 6),
108
 company self-
regulation and command-and-control variables are included along with the 
risk and control variables.  The influence of formal sanction costs and 
informal costs are both somewhat reduced, but remain significant at p < .05.  
Thus, for every unit increase in sanction risk, the odds of being willing to 
offend decrease by 43% for formal sanctions and 51% for informal 
sanctions.  This outcome may be the consequence of the high correlation 
between formal and informal costs (r = .498, see Table 2), but it is 
informative that both types of sanctions continue to have an effect when 
modeled together.  Other measures of company self-regulation that capture 
the structure or component parts of an internal compliance system (e.g., 
audits, ethics codes, hotlines) and its operation (e.g., formal reprimand, 
fired) remain nonsignificant in model 6.  Several control variables (i.e., 
desirability of the behavior, type of noncompliance, and business 
experience, see Appendix VI) and a couple of risk factors (i.e., advancing 
one’s career and perceived thrills) retain their significant effects.  
Compared with model 5, however, being asked to offend by one’s 
supervisor is no longer significant. 
At this point, our results suggest that both formal legal and informal 
(but business-salient) sanction threats can inhibit environmental 
noncompliance.  However, intra-organizational control mechanisms (such 
as self-reporting, audits, or hotlines) do not directly affect noncompliance 
when modeled alone or in conjunction with other regulatory levers for this 
group of respondents.  Importantly, none of the interventions appears to 
substantially lessen the powerful influence of career benefits on offending 
intentions. 
 
108 A reviewer raised concerns about the large number of independent variables in the 
model.  Although we did not experience any difficulty fitting the models (e.g., perfect 
prediction), we examined the variance inflation factor score for each variable in the analysis.  
None exceeded 2.24 and most were below 2.  See infra Appendix III, Table 3. 
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One possible explanation for the continued importance of perceived 
career benefits on offending is that the true relationship between regulatory 
levers, benefits, and noncompliance is multiplicative instead of additive.  
So we explored some likely interactions between variables drawing from 
the extant literature.  We expected, for instance, that people who strongly 
believed the illegal act would benefit their careers would be less likely to be 
deterred by potential formal legal proceedings
109
 and informal sanction 
threats.  Further analysis (not reported here) failed to reveal a significant 
interaction between formal sanctions and perceived benefits to one’s career, 
but we did discover a modest interaction (p < .07) between career benefit 
and informal sanctions (see Table 3, model 7).
110
  For people who perceive 
greater career advancement associated with the illegal act (compared with 
those who perceive less benefit), informal sanctions matter less in 
predicting offending likelihood.  Using predicted probabilities to 
demonstrate, when the person perceives no career benefit, the probability of 
offending decreases by 0.25 (from 0.31 to 0.06) as the perceived informal 
sanctions increase from 1 SD below the mean to 1 SD above.  When the 
person ranks the likelihood that offending would advance his career as a 5 
(out of a possible 10),
111
 the probability of offending only decreases by 
0.171 (from 0.47 to 0.30) when perceived informal sanctions are increased 
from 1 SD below the mean to 1 SD above.  This implies that when a person 
perceives a large career benefit, she is less likely to consider informal 
sanctions before deciding to offend.  The perceived benefit of illegal 
behavior for this group appears to trump any anticipated loss of respect and 
future harm to job prospects associated with the informal discovery that 
promotes crime inhibition for others in the sample.  Although this finding is 
modest,
112
 it points out that some regulatory elements may be less salient 
for managers who are more instrumentally oriented. 
The empirical literature also suggests that regulatory interventions 
might operate differently for “experienced” respondents.  We ran models 1–
6 on a subset of scenarios in which the respondent reported personal 
experience with the environmental conditions described in any of the 
 
109 Both types of formal sanctions (threats directed at the firm and individual managers) 
were analyzed for multiplicative effects. 
110 To ease interpretation, the variables were mean-centered prior to creating the 
interaction.  Mean-centered values are reported in model 7.  None of the firm self-regulatory 
variables (e.g., elements and operation of an internal compliance system) interacted with 
career benefit. 
111 Only 13% of the sample ranked career benefits above a 5. 
112 Model comparisons (with and without the interaction term) fail to show an improved 
fit for the model with the interaction.  However, the pseudo r2 for the model increases from 
.36 to .37. 
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scenarios (N = 177).  While some coefficients dropped to nonsignificance 
in these models (possibly due to the reduction in sample size), the overall 
results were similar.  There were not enough cases to run all six models on 
the subsample of scenarios in which respondents reported no personal 
experience (N = 60), but a likelihood-ratio test indicated that models 1–3 
were not significantly different for respondents with personal experience 
and those without. 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY STRATEGY 
This research was conducted to learn more about corporate 
environmental crime prevention-and-control strategies in the context of the 
kinds of pushes and pulls toward crime that company managers may 
experience.  Specifically, we examined whether offending intentions would 
be lessened in the presence of particular regulatory elements drawn from 
cooperative and punitive intervention strategies.  Although our sample of 
respondents is nonrandom, a nontrivial number of managers in this study 
reported a chance of offending under experimentally generated conditions 
(N = 61, or 37.9% of the respondents).  For this select group of managers, 
certain crime prevention-and-control strategies are more successful than 
others.  For instance, the perceived certainty and severity of legal sanctions 
that target responsible managers deter environmental wrongdoing.  Thus, as 
others have discovered,
113
 credible enforcement by the state inhibits 
offending propensity for our respondents as well.  Counter to expectations, 
however, perceptions of the laws themselves (e.g., are they too strict or too 
lenient?) are unrelated to intentions.  Our managers appear neither defiant 
(more apt to offend because the law is seen as unfair) nor willing to take 
advantage of weak laws. 
Our results also highlight the symbiosis between formal and informal 
controls.  Formal sanctions do not work in isolation.  As Ayers and 
Braithwaite suggest, salient legal consequences can buttress extralegal 
controls.
114
  In effect, the threat of external enforcement adds an additional 
layer of crime-control capacity for managers who are uninhibited by a 
moral sense of right and wrong, by their understanding of how others 
(including their colleagues) are likely to view their behavior, and by the 
extent to which they think the discovery of these acts would bring shame on 
themselves (i.e., informal sanction threats).  Internal compliance systems 
per se had no significant impact on behavioral intentions, nor did specific 
outcomes associated with such systems, such as being internally 
 
113 See Gunningham et al., supra note 30. 
114 See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 8, at 150.  These effects are additive and not 
multiplicative.  We did not find an interaction between formal and informal sanction threats. 
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reprimanded or fired (relative to the firm doing nothing when transgressions 
were discovered).  However, most of these variables showed the expected 
negative relationship with offending intentions and perhaps, given the 
difficulties with small sample sizes and statistical power, would have 
shown stronger effects had there been more respondents. 
In general, the risk of environmental crime appears least likely when 
there is a credible legal threat for noncompliance and/or when one 
perceives informal consequences associated with offending, such as losing 
the respect of one’s significant others, to be certain and costly.  The 
presence of these control mechanisms, however, does not negate some of 
the more pernicious risk factors (i.e., career benefits or perceived thrills), 
which remain significantly associated with noncompliance, especially in the 
command-and-control models.  Company self-regulation that draws on 
informal social controls may be somewhat more effective at alleviating the 
attractions of crime than deterrence-based interventions (as indicated by the 
slightly diminished coefficient for career benefits in models 2, 4, and 6).  
However, even with a full complement of control mechanisms, respondents 
who perceive career benefits and thrills associated with offending are 
significantly more likely to report offending proclivity.  This is especially 
true for those on the “high end” of perceived benefits—those for whom 
intra-organizational discovery or stigma from family, friends, or business 
associates appears to matter less (model 7).  To affect these kinds of 
offending risks, changes in company incentives for managers might be 
needed.  For instance, structuring internal rewards to prioritize a broader 
measure of excellence (e.g., profits and compliance) over a simple focus on 
the bottom line may persuade self-interested individuals to comply with the 
law while pursuing career advancement. 
Finally, across all seven models, respondents are significantly less 
likely to violate environmental law when the act: (1) is perceived as likely 
dangerous to humans and wildlife and (2) is viewed as undesirable.  These 
findings reinforce what sociologists have emphasized since Durkheim—
social norms influence how we behave.
115
  In this particular case, our 
results highlight the importance of a human health and environmental 
norm
116
 that—if replicated in a larger random sample—has policy 
implications on its own merits.  Knowing that individuals respond to 
information about human health and environmental harms, announcements 
about new environmental regulations and enforcement actions can be 
framed around this message.  If we know that certain types of violations are 
viewed as more undesirable than others, it will be easier to justify targeting 
 
115 Or, how we predict we will behave. 
116 See Vandenbergh, supra note 51, at 59. 
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these behaviors for more stringent enforcement while other, less serious 
(and probably more common) acts, are better left to self-regulatory 
measures.  It would be a mistake, however, to assume that normative 
sanctions alone will prevent minor violations.  Braithwaite’s family model 
and enforcement pyramid emphasize that norms must be reinforced by 
moral authority.
117
  When norms fail, the government must be ready and 
willing to intervene. 
Although our results should be substantiated by further study, the 
findings have implications for regulatory policy more broadly.  First, both 
informal sanctions and command-and-control strategies lower the 
likelihood of corporate crime.  The risk of corporate offending increases 
when there is not a credible legal threat or when one’s duty to behave 
ethically is not reinforced by colleagues or through fear of informal 
sanctions.  Second, the deterrent capacity of these control mechanisms does 
not negate certain corporate or individual risk factors, which remain 
significantly associated with noncompliance.  This suggests that current 
policy levers do not fully mitigate offending risks and may indicate that a 
one-size-fits-all policy is shortsighted.  Last, our research has several 
implications for how regulators can frame environmental messages, utilize 
scarce resources, and align regulatory levers with specific types of offenses.  
Future research should untangle whether the processes and control 
mechanisms we discovered in this study are similar for other types of 
corporate crime. 
 
117 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 14. 
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Appendix I 
Vignette Dimensions and Levels 




RELEASE TOXINS Significant Noncompliance: vignette 
depicts scenario about discharging toxins 
into a local waterway 
 
COMPLIANCE Technical Noncompliance: vignette depicts 
scenario about ignoring an EPA compliance 
order [reference category] 
 
Locus of Control  
ASKED Is asked by a higher level manager 
 
ASKS Mgr. asks an employee [reference category] 
 
Firm EPA Volunteer Status  
VOLUNTARY REDUCT Volunteered to participate in an EPA-
sponsored pollution-reduction program 
 
DECLINE  Was contacted by the EPA to participate in 
a voluntary pollution-reduction program but 
declined to do so [reference category] 
 
Environmental Constraints  
FOREIGN COMPETE Losing ground to foreign competitors 
 
ECONOMIC HEALTHY             Economically healthy [reference category] 
 
ECON DETERIORATING     Economically deteriorating 
 
Managerial Ethics  
ETHICS GUIDE  Ethical considerations guide top 
management hiring decisions, performance 
evaluations, and promotions 
 
ETHICS DISTINCT Ethical considerations are considered 
important, but distinct, from business 
decisions 
 
ETHICS IRRELEVANT  Ethical considerations are considered 
mostly irrelevant to business decisions 
[reference category] 
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Management Location  
MID-LEVEL MGR  A midlevel manager 
 
UPPER-LEVEL MGR  An upper-level manager 
 
Internal Compliance Structure  
HOTLINE A hotline in which violation of compliance 
can be anonymously reported 
   
ETHICS Mandatory ethics training 
 
AUDITS Internal random environmental audits in 
which violations of compliance can be 
uncovered 
 
SELF REPORT Mandatory self-reporting to the EPA of   
monthly release data  
 
ETHICS CODE  An ethics code [reference category] 
 
Internal Compliance Operation  
NO ACTION  The firm took no action against an 
employee who was discovered violating 
environmental regulations [reference 
category] 
 
REPRIMANDED The firm severely reprimanded an 
employee who violated environmental 
regulations 
 
FIRED  The firm fired an employee who violated 
environmental regulations 
 
Note: All vignette dimensions take the value of 1 when they are present and 0 when they are 
absent. 
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Appendix II  
Sample Scenarios 
Environmental Violations 
1.  Lee, a middle-level manager at AmCorp, asks an employee to 
ignore an environmental agency’s demand to act on a compliance 
order.  This practice is common in the firm.  Lee believes that ignoring the 
environmental agency’s demand may weaken the firm’s competitive 
position. 
AmCorp is a subsidiary of USA Corp, a publicly held U.S.-based firm 
that promotes itself as a green company.  USA Corp owns and operates one 
fully integrated manufacturing facility in a large urban center.  The facility, 
which has been refurbished, is designated as a minor discharger according 
to the EPA ranking system, with an environmental compliance record that 
has exceeded regulatory compliance standards.  Last year, USA Corp was 
contracted by the EPA to participate in a voluntary pollution-reduction 
program but declined to do so. 
USA Corp is currently experiencing declining sales and revenues in an 
industry that is economically healthy. 
At USA Corp, ethical considerations are considered mostly irrelevant 
to business decisions.  The firm has mandatory ethics training but the firm 
took no action against an employee who was discovered violating 
environmental regulations. 
 
2.  Lee, a low-level manager at AmCorp, is asked by a supervisor to 
discharge toxins into a local waterway that exceeded permitted levels 
by 200%.  This practice is common in the firm.  Lee believes that 
discharging toxins into a local waterway may strengthen the firm’s 
competitive position. 
AmCorp is a publicly held U.S.-based firm that promotes itself as a 
green company.  AmCorp owns and operates one fully integrated 
manufacturing facility in a large urban center.  The facility, which is over 
20 years old, is designated as a minor discharger according to the EPA 
ranking system with an environmental compliance record that has exceeded 
regulatory compliance standards.  Last year, AmCorp volunteered to 
participate in an EPA-sponsored pollution-reduction program. 
AmCorp is currently experiencing declining sales and revenues in an 
industry that is losing ground to foreign competitors. 
At AmCorp, ethical considerations guide top management hiring 
decisions, performance evaluations, and promotions.  The firm has an ethics 
code and the firm severely reprimanded an employee who recently violated 
environmental regulations. 




NIJ Participating and Nonparticipating Firms, 1995–2000 
 
Nonparticipants 
N = 71 a 
Participant 1 Participant 2 
Mean # of facilities 3.27 (2.29) 16.83 6.00 










# of informal 




# of formal 














Yearly violation rate 












Due to missing data, the sample sizes used to compute descriptive statistics for the 
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Table 2 
Comparing TMone Respondents to Nonrespondents, Excluding 




# of Respondents 
(%) 
# of Nonrespondents 
(%) 
Type of Professionb   
Environmentally Related 
Profession 
37 (80.4) 278 (77.2) 
Not Environmental 9 (19.6) 82 (22.8) 
Total  46 (100) 360 (100) 
Type of Businessb   
Profit-Oriented Business (Not 
Including Consulting) 
3 (6.5) 73 (20.4) 
Government Agency 1 (2.1) 11 (3.1) 
NGO or Civic Association 14 (30.4) 104 (29.1) 
Law Firm 1 (2.1) 12 (3.4) 
Private Consulting Firm 27 (58.7) 155 (43.4) 
Other 0 (0.0) 2 (0.6) 
Total 46 357 
Genderb   
Male 26 (60.5) 226 (69.3) 
Female 17 (39.5) 100 (30.7) 
Total 43 (100) 326 (100) 
Average Number of Employees 
Per Companyc 
14.04 9.59 
Note: Totals may not add up to N = 411 as some individuals’ information was not 
given in enough detail to categorize.  Also, percentages may not up to 100% due to 
rounding. 
a One respondent responded to the survey, but also was listed as having his or her 
survey notification letter returned.  We assumed the latter coding was in error so this 
individual was included as a respondent in the above analyses. 
b Pearson Chi-square tests indicated that there were no significant differences 
between respondents and nonrespondents by Type of Profession, Type of Business, or 
Gender.  
c An independent-samples t-test showed a significant difference in company size 
by response status, p < .01 
 
2013] CORPORATE CRIME CONTROL 273 
Table 3 
Variance Inflation Scores, Full Model 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Zinformal sanctions 2.24 0.447264 
Original sample 2.1 0.47633 
Informal sanctions 1.86 0.539082 
CareerXinformal sanctions 1.84 0.543545 
Danger to life 1.76 0.569553 
Advance career 1.68 0.596472 
Ethics training 1.67 0.599498 
Fired 1.65 0.604242 
Audits 1.64 0.611286 
Reprimand 1.62 0.616837 
Self-report 1.6 0.626457 
Ethics distinct 1.49 0.671535 
Adequacy of law 1.47 0.682192 
Ethics guide mgt. 1.46 0.68455 
Hotline 1.42 0.705503 
Foreign competition 1.41 0.709856 
Economic deteriorate 1.4 0.714221 
Situation real 1.37 0.73174 
Years of business 
experience 1.31 0.763621 
Release toxins 1.26 0.794501 
Personal experience 1.26 0.794955 
Conditional compliance 1.26 0.796812 
Voluntary reduction 1.23 0.813388 
Desirability of behavior 1.22 0.821074 
Thrill 1.19 0.84052 
Asked 1.11 0.900475 
Mid-level Manager 1.08 0.923981 
Mean VIF 1.5  
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Appendix IV 
Description of Variables 
Variable Variable Definition 





What is the chance that you would 
act as the manager did under these 
circumstances? 
1 = 10% or more chance of 
noncompliance (29.67%) 
0 = 0% chance of noncompliance 
(70.33%) 
Control Variables  
Toxins 
vignette 
Scenario depicts significant 
noncompliance (i.e., discharging 
toxins) as opposed to technical 
noncompliance (i.e., ignore EPA 
order).  
1 = Significant Noncompliance 
(52.85%) 
0 = Technical Noncompliance 
(47.15%) 
Danger to life 
11 point mean score scale composed 
of two items:  
1) What is the chance the behavior 
described in the scenario will 
endanger human life? 
2) What is the chance the behavior 
described in the scenario will 
endanger aquatic/wildlife? 
0 (no chance at all)  to 10 (100% 
chance) 
(M = 6.76, SD = 2.57) 
Realistic 
scenario 
Regardless of what you would do, is 
the situation described in this 
scenario believable or realistic? 
1 = Yes (65.04%) 
0 = No (34.96%) 
Desirability 
of behavior 
Please rate this behavior according 
to its desirability. 
0 (not at all desirable) to 10 (very 
desirable) 




Years of business experience. (M = 27.05, SD = 9.75) 
Personal 
experience* 
NIJ sample: Have you personally 
experienced or known about 
situations similar to those described 
in the scenarios?  
TMone sample: If you have ever 
worked in publicly or privately 
owned business, have you 
personally experienced situations 
similar to those described in the 
scenarios? 
1 = Yes (74.68%) 
0 = No (25.32%) 
Original 
sample 
Was the respondent part of the 
original NIJ study? 
1 = Yes (51.22%) 
0 = No (48.78%) 
Situational Risk 
Asked 
Manager in the scenario is asked by 
a higher level manager to engage in 
violating behavior. 
1 = Manager is asked by higher 
level employee (52.44%) 
0 = Manager asks an employee 
(47.56%) 
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Variable Variable Definition 




Scenario depicts a midlevel 
manager. 
1 = Midlevel manager (52.03%) 
0 = Upper-level manager (47.97%) 
Economically 
deteriorating  
Industry described in scenario is 
economically deteriorating (versus 
economically healthy). 
1 = Yes (28.86%) 
0 = No (71.14%) 
Foreign 
competition 
Industry described in scenario is 
losing ground to foreign competitors 
(versus economically healthy). 
1 = Yes (36.18%) 




How much would it advance your 
career if you did what the manager 
did under these circumstances? 
0 (no chance at all) to 10 (100% 
chance) 
(M = 1.79, SD = 2.58) 
Thrill 
How exciting or thrilling would it 
be for you if you did what the 
manager did under the 
circumstances? 
0 (not exciting) to 10 (very exciting) 
(M =  0.43, SD = 1.34) 
Conditional 
compliance* 
Extent to which respondent agrees 
with the statement: “An individual 
should comply with the law so long 
as it does not go against what s/he 
thinks is right.” 
0 (do not agree) to 10 (strongly 




Scenario depicts a firm that 
volunteered to participate in an 
EPA-sponsored pollution-reduction 
program. 
1 = Firm volunteered to participate 
in an EPA-sponsored reduction 
program (51.63%) 
0 = Firm was contacted by the EPA 
to participate in a voluntary 
reduction program but declined to 
do so (48.37%) 
Ethics guide 
management 
The scenario depicts a firm in which 
ethical considerations guide top 
management hiring decisions, 
performance evaluations, and 
promotions. 
1 = Yes (32.93%) 
0 = No (67.07%) 
Ethics are 
distinct 
The scenario depicts a firm in which 
ethical considerations are 
considered important, but distinct, 
from business decisions. 
1 = Yes (35.37%) 
0 = No (64.63%) 
Random 
audits 
The scenario depicts a firm which 
uses internal random environmental 
audits to uncover violations of 
compliance. 
1 = Yes (23.17%) 
0 = No (76.83%) 
Self-
reporting 
The firm described in the scenario 
has been mandated to report 
monthly release data to the EPA. 
1 = Yes (18.29%) 
0 = No (81.71%) 
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Variable Variable Definition 




The scenario depicts a firm that 
mandates ethics training for 
employees. 
1 = Yes (20.33%) 
0 = No (79.67%) 
Hotline 
The scenario depicts a firm that uses 
a hotline in which violations of 
compliance can be anonymously 
reported. 
1 = Yes (12.20%) 
0 = No (87.80%) 
Fired 
The firm depicted in the scenario 
fired an employee who violated 
environmental regulations (versus 
the firm took no action). 
1 = Yes (36.18%) 
0 = No (63.82%) 
Reprimand 
The firm depicted in the scenario 
severely reprimanded an employee 
who violated environmental 
regulations (versus the firm took no 
action). 
1 = Yes (32.52%) 
0 = No (67.48%) 
Informal 
sanctions 
Informal sanction cost scale: 3 items 
on the certainty/severity of losing 
respect of business associates, loss 
of job, and loss of future job 
prospects.  We multiplied the 
certainty and severity of each item 
by each other as well as by the 
chance that the behavior would 
become known within the firm, then 
summed those three scores.  This 
scale was also normalized.    
(M = 0, SD = 1) 
Command and Control 
Formal 
sanctions 
Formal sanction cost scale: 5 items 
about the certainty/severity of 
civil/criminal prosecution of the 
individual as well as the certainty of 
a regulatory investigation. 
(M = .05, SD = .99) 
Adequacy of 
laws 
How adequate is the law governing 
this behavior? 
0 (too strict) to 10 (too lenient) 
(M = 3.88, SD = 2.21) 
*Demographic or attitudinal information collected from each respondent. 
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Appendix V 
Comparison of Significant Variables Between TMone  
and NIJ Samples 
 TMone Sample (N = 111) NIJ Sample (N = 126) 
 B (Robust SE) B (Robust SE) 
 Odds Ratio Odds Ratio 
Control variables   












Career 0.10 (0.08) 
1.10 
 0.40 (.13)*** 
1.48 












Pseudo r2 0.34 0.37 
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Appendix VI 






Only Controls  
   
B   (Robust  SE) 
Model 1:  
Risk Factors   
  
B    (Robust SE) 
Model 2: 
Informal 
Sanctions    
B    (Robust SE) 
Model 3:  
Self-Regulation  
   
B     (Robust SE) 
























































































B    (Robust SE) B    (Robust SE) B    (Robust SE) B    (Robust SE) 






































































Pseudo r2 0.35 0.31 0.36 0.37 
Note: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
 
